pp2p18 imaginare, imaginatio NOT imago, imagines NOT figura pictura

Meaning | A type of thinking-operation, (cogitatio-operatio) hence taking place in the mind (attribute of thought). Imagination produces an imagined idea or imaginatio, NOT an imago. Imago, imagines are affections of the human body (attribute of extension) and are dealt with on another notes page, since they are entirely different things. Compare: when a drawing has been printed, the imago is NOT the idea conceived by your mind when you look at the paper, but the constellation of ink that the printing has left on the paper, also called a vestigium, an extended thing, not thought. Similarly, when not paper but your own body is affected, the "print" (vestigium) left in the body is the imago. The perceived idea or imagination (imaginatio) of that print is what the mind belonging to that body "makes" of that extended thing. So an imaginatio can be mistaken whereas the word "mistaken" does not befit an imago: an imago is an extended thing. 1. Images are in the body. Images are imprints, vestigia, scars, state changes, caused by external corporeal impacts affecting the body in accidental association. 2. Figures (figurae, picturae) formed in the brain (cerebra) are NOT, we are emphatically told (2p17s, 2p48s reproduced below) images. 3. Imagining is an operation , NOT of the body but of the mind (a "res cogitans"): the concatenation of ideas caused by the mind's perception of (bodily) images. Imagining is a prone-to-flaws operation of thought based on accidental experience that a virtuous person liberates himself from. Imagining leads to the first kind of cognitio (knowledge). Pure imaginare (unaided by other adequate ideas) can, by chance, lead to true ideas, but the mind perceiving it in that manner acquires no adequate knowledge.
Related concepts | All other types of cogitatio-operatio, including will and all emotions
Occurrence | [geomap] Also densely outside the deductive structure, notably: 1apx, 2p17s
Not linked | Imago is not in the mind but in the body

1apx ... or rather (the brain is not the mind) ...
... everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination... | ... unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse ...

2p17s Videmus itaque non sunt veluti praesentia ... this scholium is called imaginationis definitionem in {5p21} and allows in association with other quotes below to infer the steps in the process from body-impact to imago and then to imagined idea (called imaginatio NOT imago): ... 1. an external body makes an impact on the human body ... 2. the resulting affectiones of the human body are called imagines (elsewhere vestigia) ... 3. perceptio by the mind produces ideas of those affectiones in the mind ... 4. the effect of the impact, the imprint, also called -see other quotes of this page- vestigium, remains in the body after the impact: vestigia-imagines are durable ... 5. when the mind recalls the idea that perception produced of such an imago-vestigium but in association with an inadequate idea of the external body that caused it, the mind is said to imagine. N.B. An imago is part of the human body (corpus humanus) but the verb imaginare denotes a cogitatio-operatio, an operation of the mind (mens) ... Inadequacy of ideas comes about NOT by imagination ITSELF but by the absence of other adequate ideas able to adequately "qualify" the imagined idea (one can see something that looks like a unicorn, but know it isn't, and know what the visual impression is really caused by). Ability to thus imagine a thing in itself is necessarily, and in all cases, positive mind-power, but it strengthens or weakens you depending on whether or not in addition you have the adequate ideas necessary to save you from wrong conclusions ...
... to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault ... | ... ut verba usitata retineamus, corporis humani affectiones quarum ideae corpora externa velut nobis praesentia repraesentant, rerum imagines vocabimus tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus. Atque hic ut quid sit error indicare incipiam, notetis velim mentis imaginationes in se spectatas nihil erroris continere sive mentem ex eo quod imaginatur, non errare sed tantum quatenus consideratur carere idea quae existentiam illarum rerum quas sibi praesentes imaginatur, secludat. Nam si mens dum res non existentes ut sibi praesentes imaginatur, simul sciret res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suae naturae ...

{2p18 pluribus corporibus simul} ... association not by essence (ratio) but by time ...
... If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also. | ... Si corpus humanum a duobus vel pluribus corporibus simul affectum fuerit semel, ubi mens postea eorum aliquod imaginabitur, statim et aliorum recordabitur.

2p18s memoria ... memory, a pool of ideas associated accidentally, that is, not ordered and concatenated by ratio, intellect ...
... Memory ... simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] (affectiones) of the human body ... ... association arises according to the order ... of the modifications [Lat: affectiones] of the human body ... distinguish ..from ... order of the intellect ... for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things ... | ... memoria ... concatenatio idearum naturam rerum quae extra corpus humanum sunt involventium quae in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani. ... concatenationem fieri secundum ordinem ... affectionum corporis humani ... distinguerem ... ordinem intellectus ... exempli gratia ex cogitatione vocis pomi homo romanus statim in cogitationem fructus incidet qui nullam cum articulato illo sono habet similitudinem nec aliquid commune nisi quod ejusdem hominis corpus ab his duobus affectum spe fuit hoc est quod ipse homo spe vocem pomum audivit dum ipsum fructum videret et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet prout rerum imagines uniuscujusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit. Nam miles exempli gratia visis in arena equi vestigiis statim ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem equitis et inde in cogitationem belli etc. incidet. At rusticus ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem aratri, agri etc. incidet et sic unusquisque prout rerum imagines consuevit hoc vel alio modo jungere et concatenare, ...

When "imaginare" first appears in the deductive system in {2p18}, it has already been used in scholia on over 30 loci, one of which, 2p17s (or see quote above) is referred to in 2p26c

{2p26c corpus imaginatur cognitionem non habet} ... imagination on its own does not lead to adequate ideas ... as stated in 2p17s: to achieve adequatio you first need to combine the imagined idea or knowledge (cognitio) with other, adequate ideas (knowledge) of the essence and existence of the object (ideatum) of the imagined idea ...
... In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof. | ... {2p26}: Quatenus mens humana corpus externum imaginatur eatenus adaequatam ejus cognitionem non habet.
... When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the affections of its own body, we say that it imagines ... | ... Cum mens humana per ideas affectionum sui corporis corpora externa contemplatur, eandem tum imaginari dicimus ...

{2p29c mentem confusam tantum cognitionem} ... perceiving ex communi naturae ordine (as leads to remembrance 2p18s memoria) produces inadequate knowledge ...
... the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies ... | ... mentem humanam quoties ex communi naturae ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adaequatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem ...

2p40s1 aliae causae ... another explanation how human knowledge can be imperfect ("theodice"): how the formation of images (IN THE BODY) leads to imperfect knowledge ... (N.B. attributo entis: a local, NOT the formally defined sense of attributus) ...
the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images ... .within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused ... When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. ... images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes ... From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human body that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals ... these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for i nstance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body ... | ... humanum corpus quandoquidem limitatum est, tantum est capax certi imaginum numeri ... in se distincte simul formandi, qui si excedatur, hae imagines confundi incipient ... At ubi imagines in corpore plane confunduntur, mens etiam omnia corpora confuse sine ulla distinctione imaginabitur et quasi sub uno attributo comprehendet nempe sub attributo entis, rei etc. ... imagines non semper que vigeant et ex aliis causis his analogis ... Ex similibus deinde causis ortae sunt notiones illae quas universales vocant ut Homo, Equus, Canis etc. videlicet quia in corpore humano tot imagines exempli gratia hominum formantur simul ut vim imaginandi, non quidem penitus sed eo usque tamen superent ut singulorum parvas differentias (videlicet uniuscujusque colorem, magnitudinem etc.) eorumque determinatum numerum mens imaginari nequeat et id tantum in quo omnes quatenus corpus ab iisdem afficitur, conveniunt, distincte imaginetur nam ab eo corpus maxime scilicet ab unoquoque singulari affectum fuit atque hoc nomine hominis exprimit hocque de infinitis singularibus praedicat ... has notiones non ab omnibus eodem modo formari sed apud unumquemque variare pro ratione rei a qua corpus affectum spius fuit quamque facilius mens imaginatur vel recordatur. Exempli gratia qui spius cum admiratione hominum staturam contemplati sunt, sub nomine hominis intelligent animal erect statur; qui vero aliud assueti sunt contemplari, aliam hominum communem imaginem formabunt nempe hominem esse animal risibile, animal bipes sine plumis, animal rationale et sic de reliquis unusquisque pro dispositione sui corporis rerum universales imagines formabit ... .

2p40s2 percipere 1 sensus mutilate 2 signis 3 notiones communes ... ."imaginatio" is the first of three kinds of knowledge (cognitio) ...
... we ... perceive and form our general notions: | ... nos multa percipere et notiones universales formare:
First kind: (1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses ... I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things ... I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. | Primi generis: I. ex singularibus nobis per sensus mutilate, confuse et sine ordine ad intellectum repraesentatis ... et ideo tales perceptiones cognitionem ab experientia vaga vocare consuevi. II. Ex signis exempli gratia ex eo quod auditis aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur et earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis per quas res imaginamur ... Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum cognitionem primi generis, opinionem vel imaginationem in posterum vocabo.
Second Kind: (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things ... this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. | Secundi generis: III. denique ex eo quod notiones communes rerumque proprietatum ideas adaequatas habemus ... atque hunc rationem et secundi generis cognitionem vocabo.
Third kind: Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. | Tertii generis: Praeter haec duo cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud tertium quod scientiam intuitivam vocabimus. Atque hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum.

{2p44c1 sola imaginatione contingentes} ... contingency only in imagination ...
... only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent. | ... a sola imaginatione pendere quod res tam respectu praeteriti quam futuri ut contingentes contemplemur.

2p48s nullam dari facultatem absolutam ... imagines are formed in the eyes and brains, they are no ideas nor conceptions of thought ...
... lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought. | ... ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines quales in fundo oculi et si placet, in medio cerebro formantur sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.

{3p16 imaginamur simile} ... written in full: first the body is affected by an external body, that is: the body acquires a corporeal image ("print", vestigium "scar" [see: Meaning, top if page]). Then the mind, through the passive (!) operation of perceptio [more]] is affected by the image and acquires (NOT again an image but:) an idea ...
object ... when the mind is affected by the image thereof ... | objecto ... cum mens ejus imagine afficietur ...

{5p01 ordinantur concatenantur mente corpore} ... images of things are ... in the body ... This is related quoted above ...
... as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications [[at: affectiones] of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body. | ... cogitationes rerumque [non-exl. non-exh] ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente, ita corporis affectiones seu [mng-eqv] rerum imagines ad amussimae ordinantur et concatenantur in corpore.

{5p14 Mens potest rerum imagines Dei ideam referantur} ... images are bodily modifications..
... bodily modifications [Lat: affectiones] or images of things ... | ... corporis affectiones seu [mng-eqv] rerum imagines ...

{5p21 Mens potest durante corpore} ... no body no imagination ...
... The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures. | ... Mens nihil imaginari potest neque rerum praeteritarum recordari nisi durante corpore.

Equivalence claims involving imaginare, imaginatio NOT imago, imagines NOT figura pictura
{3p55} | 1. The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is, or can do 2. it is the mind's nature to imagine only such things as assert its power of activity | 1. Mentis essentia id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat 2. de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt
{3p56} | 1. imagine 2. be affected by an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the nature of an external body. | 1. imaginamur 2. afficimur affectu qui naturam nostri corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit.
{3de04} | 1. Wonder 2. the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts | 1. Admiratio 2. rei alicujus imaginatio in qua mens defixa propterea manet quia haec singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem.
{3de05} | 1. Contempt 2. the conception (imaginatio) of anything which touches the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it | 1. Contemptus 2. rei alicujus imaginatio quae mentem adeo parum tangit ut ipsa mens ex rei praesentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum quae in ipsa re non sunt quam quae in ipsa sunt.
{3de18} | 1. Pity 2. pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we imagine to be like ourselves | 1. Commiseratio 2. tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit.
{3de30} | 1. Honour 2. pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we imagine to be praised by others. | 1. Gloria 2. laetitia concomitante idea alicujus nostrae actionis quam alios laudare imaginamur.